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Abstract. This paper studies how the exposure of a country’s corporate sector to
interest rate and exchange rate changes affects the probability of a currency crisis. To
analyze this question, we present a model that defines currency crises as situations in
which the costs of maintaining a fixed exchange rate exceed the costs of
abandonment. The results show that a higher exposure to interest rate changes
increases the probability of crisis through an increased need for output loss
compensation and an increased efficacy of monetary policy in stimulating output. A
higher exposure to exchange rate changes also increases the need for output loss
compensation. However, it lowers the efficacy of monetary policy in stimulating
output through the adverse balance sheet effects of exchange rate depreciation. As a
result, its effect on the probability of crisis is ambiguous.
JEL classification: E52, E58, F34.
Keywords: Currency crises; monetary policy; short-term debt; foreign debt;
corporate balance sheets.
1. INTRODUCTION
During the last three decades, many countries and regions around the world
have suffered from currency crises.
1 Their origin remains the source of much
controversy. From an academic perspective, an extensive economic literature
has evolved, both theoretical and empirical.
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1. Examples include Mexico (1973–82), Argentina (1978–81), Europe (1992–93), again Mexico
(1994–95), East Asia (1997–98), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999) and, most recently, Turkey
(2000–01) and Argentina (2001–02).
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)The theoretical literature on currency crises started with the works of Flood
and Garber (1984) and Krugman (1979), which are now often referred to as
‘first-generation models of currency crises’.
2 These models were developed in
response to crises in Latin America in the 1970s and early 1980s, which were
characterized by preceding periods of overly expansive budgetary policies
combined with fixed exchange rate regimes. The models show how the
monetary financing of structural government deficits leads to a gradual
depletion of the central bank’s foreign reserves, as the central bank stands
ready to buy the excess domestic money in return for foreign money. At some
point in time, a speculative attack occurs that wipes out the central bank’s
remaining stock of foreign reserves and leads to a collapse of the fixed
exchange rate regime.
Although they well explained the early crises in Latin America, first-
generation models suffered from some weaknesses. This became particularly
apparent after the crisis in the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1992 and
1993, which was not preceded by structural government deficits or a gradual
depletion of foreign reserves. Instead, governments widened their exchange
rate bands due to sudden severe speculative attacks on their currencies. This
raised questions on whether the crises could be explained solely by
fundamentals or whether speculative attacks contained self-fulfilling features.
In response to these questions, a new strand of ‘second-generation’ or ‘escape
clause’ models emerged.
3 These models show that if policy-makers face a
tradeoff between exchange rate stability and other objectives, such as
employment during the EMS crisis, the future level of the exchange rate
may be subject to multiple equilibria.
4 If the market does not expect a
devaluation, the costs of maintaining a fixed exchange rate remain low and
the policy-makers choose to hold on to it. However, if market participants do
expect a devaluation, this expectation can become self-fulfilling because it
increases the costs of maintenance by forcing policy-makers to raise the
interest rate.
Although first- and second-generation models have done reasonably well
in explaining many past crisis episodes, they do not seem to fully explain the
2. Other contributions include Blanco and Garber (1986), Dornbusch (1987), Edwards and
Montiel (1989), Obstfeld (1984), Van Wijnbergen (1991), Willman (1988) and Wyplosz
(1986). A survey is provided by Age ´nor et al. (1992).
3. Examples include Bensaid and Jeanne (1997), Cole and Kehoe (1996), Jeanne (1997a,
1997b), Jeanne and Masson (2000) and Obstfeld (1986, 1994, 1996, 1997). The latter study
mentions several reasons for why raising the interest rate is costly, one of which refers to the
‘weakening of the financial and banking system’, and is therefore also sometimes referred to
as a third-generation model. For a survey of second-generation or escape clause models, see
Flood and Marion (1999), Jeanne (2000), Rangvid (2001) and Saxena (2004).
4. The existence of multiple equilibria is most often identified as the key characteristic of
second-generation literature, as in e.g. De Grauwe (1997). Other characterizations include
the presence of an optimizing policy-maker, as in Isard (1995) and Sutherland (1995), and
the endogeneity of exchange rate policy, as in Buiter et al. (1998) and Cavallari and Corsetti
(1996).
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)more recent crisis in East Asia (1997–98). These countries did not experience
any first-generation-like fiscal problems and nor did they face the policy
tradeoff between exchange rate stability and unemployment, as some EMS
crisis countries did. Hence, new models were needed and the first attempts
to develop such models focused on problems in the banking sector. Corsetti
et al. (1999) and Krugman (1998a) argued that implicit government
guarantees led to moral hazard and an excessive level of investment, which,
after some time, collapsed when governments were no longer willing or able
to cover the losses. Chang and Velasco (1998) focused on a shortage of
liquidity in the banking system caused by a loss of confidence among
investors, analogous to the classic bank run in Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
However, it was not long until a new strand of literature emerged. This
literature, sometimes referred to as ‘third-generation literature’, stresses the
importance of balance sheet vulnerabilities and international capital flows.
5
Balance sheet crisis literature has seen two classes of models ( Jeanne and
Zettelmeyer, 2002). The first class of models considers a combination of
currency and maturity mismatches on banks’ balance sheets, where crises are
characterized by runs on short-term foreign currency debt. The second class
of models only considers a currency mismatch in corporate balance sheets,
where crises are characterized by a credit crunch and a decline in
investment.
6 In both cases, crises can be self-fulfilling, as the depreciation
of the real exchange rate inflates foreign currency debt on balance sheets,
which has severe adverse effects that validate prior crisis expectations.
Krugman (1998b) also stresses the importance of corporate balance sheet
vulnerabilities in relation to high interest rates: ‘Mexico was able to go
through a year of interest rates that ran as high as 75% and survive. Asia’s
economies, it turned out, were more vulnerable because their corporations
were much more highly leveraged. When your debt is four or five times your
equity – an unheard-of ratio in the West but standard practice in South Korea
– it doesn’t take very long for recession plus high interest rates to wipe you
out’ (Krugman, 1998b, pp. 27–32).
This paper studies how the exposure of a country’s corporate sector to
interest rate and exchange rate changes affects the probability of a currency
crisis. To analyze this question, we present a model that defines currency
crises as situations in which the costs of maintaining a fixed exchange rate
exceed the costs of abandonment. The costs of maintenance and abandon-
ment in our model arise from deviations of output and inflation from their
desired levels. The model allows us to study the impact of high corporate
5. This notion was first put forward by Dornbusch (1999) and Krugman (1999) to explain the
East Asian crisis, where corporate balance sheets were fragile, and the 1995 Mexican and
1999 Brazilian crises, where governments’ balance sheets were fragile.
6. For the first class of models, see e.g. Burnside et al. (2001a, 2001b, 2004), Chang and Velasco
(2000) and Jeanne and Wyplosz (2001). For the second class, see Aghion et al. (2000, 2001,
2004), Krugman (1999) and Schneider and Tornell (2004).
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)exposures on these deviations of output and inflation and thus on the
probability of a currency crisis.
7
The results show that a higher corporate exposure to interest rate changes
increases the risk premium that corporates have to pay on external funds.
This higher risk premium depresses investments and output and hence makes
it more costly for the monetary authorities to maintain the fixed exchange
rate. In addition, a higher corporate exposure to interest rate changes also
makes monetary policy more effective in stimulating output. This is because
corporates are more heavily exposed to interest rates and an interest rate cut
thus has a larger negative effect on the risk premium through improved
corporate balance sheet positions. A higher exposure to interest rate changes
thus increases both the need for output loss compensation and the efficacy of
monetary policy in stimulating output. These two effects create incentives for
the monetary authorities to abandon the fixed exchange rate. Hence, a higher
exposure to interest rate changes increases the probability of an abandon-
ment of the fixed exchange rate (currency crisis).
By contrast, the sign of the effect of a higher corporate exposure to
exchange rate changes is shown to be ambiguous. On the one hand, a higher
corporate exposure to exchange rate changes also increases the costs of
maintenance by raising the risk premium that firms pay on external funds.
However, whereas higher domestic debt makes monetary policy more
effective in stimulating output, higher foreign debt has the opposite effect.
Abandonment of the fixed exchange rate and a loosening of monetary policy
lead to a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Given the higher
corporate exposure to exchange rates, this depreciation has larger adverse
effects on the risk premium and thus on output. Hence, a higher exposure to
exchange rate changes increases the need for output loss compensation but
lowers the efficacy of monetary policy in stimulating output through the
adverse balance sheet effects of exchange rate depreciation. As a result, the
sign of the net effect of a higher exposure to exchange rate changes on the
probability of an abandonment of the fixed exchange rate (currency crisis) is
ambiguous.
2. THE MODEL
We use an extended version of the Dornbusch (1976) sticky-price monetary
model for the exchange rate to study a small open economy that initially runs
a fixed exchange rate. The model has three periods. In period t 1, the
monetary authorities are credibly committed to the fixed exchange rate and
7. Studies with a similar focus on output and inflation costs include Obstfeld (1994, 1996).
These studies stress the role of self-fulfilling inflationary expectations on the monetary
authorities’ commitment to the fixed exchange rate. This paper instead focuses on the role
of corporate balance sheet vulnerabilities in eroding the commitment to the fixed exchange
rate.
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)the economy is in long-run equilibrium. In period t, they either maintain the
fixed exchange rate or abandon it. Prices are sticky throughout this period
and the economy can temporarily deviate from its long-run equilibrium.
Finally, in period t þ 1, prices adjust and the economy returns to long-run
equilibrium with either a fixed or a floating exchange rate, depending on the
monetary authorities’ decision in period t.
We assume that, if the monetary authorities maintain the fixed exchange
rate in period t market participants will expect them to maintain it
throughout period t þ 1 as well. Only if the monetary authorities abandon
the fixed exchange rate in period t, market participants’ expectations adjust
and will be reflected in the period t þ 1 price level.
The model assumes the following conditions to hold in period t. All
variables are in logarithms
8 and symbols that are marked by asterisks refer to
the foreign country and are assumed to be exogenous
9:
Mt     pt ¼ g   bðit   RPtÞð 1Þ
yt ¼ yn   lðrt   rnÞþyðSt     ptÞð 2Þ
rn ¼ r* ¼ i* ¼ c ð3Þ
it ¼ i* þð Stþ1   StÞþRPt ð4Þ
Stþ1 ¼ ptþ1 ð5Þ
it ¼ rt þ _ ptþ1 ð6Þ
where Mt is the domestic nominal money supply,   pt is the domestic price level
(fixed), it is the domestic nominal interest rate, RPt is the default risk premium
in the home country relative to the foreign country, yt and yn denote the
actual and natural level of domestic real output, respectively, rt and rn denote
the actual and natural level of the domestic real interest rate, respectively, r*
is the foreign real interest rate (fixed), St is the nominal exchange rate defined
as the price of foreign currency in terms of home currency, i* is the foreign
nominal interest rate (fixed) and _ ptþ1 is period t þ 1 inflation ð¼ ptþ1   _ ptÞ.
10
g, b, l, y and c are strictly positive constants.
8. Hereafter, we use a circumflex to denote the non-logarithmic form of the variables (e.g. ^ Mt),
unless mentioned otherwise.
9. Because we study a small open economy, we assume that the foreign interest rates are
exogenous. The foreign country in our model represents the anchor country to which the
home country has fixed its exchange rate.
10. it, RPt, rt, rn, r* and i* are short notations for (1 þ it), (1 þ RPt), (1 þ rt), (1 þ rn), (1 þ r*) and
(1 þ i*), respectively.
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)Equation (1) represents equilibrium in the domestic money market. We
assume demand for real money to depend on the expected return on
domestic assets, which equals the nominal return it minus the risk premium
RPt.
11 Equation (2) denotes goods market equilibrium. Deviations of the real
interest rate from its natural level and the exchange rate from its purchasing
power parity (PPP) level
12 may cause a deviation of output from its natural
level. The former reflects the negative effect of higher interest rates on
investment as part of aggregate demand. The latter reflects the positive effect
of a real exchange rate depreciation on the current account in the short run.
Equation (3) states that the natural real interest rate equals the (fixed) foreign
real interest rate, which we assume to be constant and equal to the nominal
foreign interest rate (i.e. inflation in the foreign country is zero). Equation (4)
shows a revised version of the uncovered interest rate parity condition. We
assume imperfect substitutability of domestic and foreign assets. We think of
this as reflecting differences in default risk, which require a risk premium
(Section 2.2.1). As in period t þ 1 the economy is in long-run equilibrium, the
expected t þ 1 exchange rate in period t equals the actual exchange rate in
period t þ 1. That is, once market participants are informed about the
decision of the monetary authorities in period t, they have perfect foresight as
to the period t þ 1 price level and, hence, the period t þ 1 exchange rate
(PPP). Equation (5) represents the assumption of PPP in period t þ 1. Equation
(6) illustrates that the nominal interest rate in period t þ 1 equals the sum of
the real interest rate and the level of inflation in period t þ 1.
2.1. Financial fragility and the risk premium
We assume the risk premium on domestic assets to depend on the degree of
financial fragility in the economy. In our model, financial fragility relates to
the state of the balance sheets in the corporate sector. In particular, we define
financial fragility as the degree to which the net worth of the corporate sector
is vulnerable to increases in the domestic interest rate and/or devaluations of
the currency. Higher financial fragility therefore corresponds to higher levels
of (consolidated
13) domestic currency short-term debt (domestic debt) and/
or higher levels of (consolidated) foreign currency debt (foreign debt).
The microeconomic underpinning of the risk premium that we use in our
model follows from Bernanke et al. (2000) and Ce ´spedes et al. (2004). They
assume asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders of capital.
Borrowers have complete insight into the returns of investments, whereas
lenders cannot observe these returns unless they pay a proportional
Q3
11. Section 2.2.1 explains the determinants of the risk premium in our model.
12. The log of the foreign price level is assumed to be zero.
13. We assume the supply side of the domestic economy to consist of a positive number of
identical firms. The equations hereafter not only apply to firms at the individual level but
also refer to the entire economy at the consolidated level.
S. C. W. Eijffinger and B. Goderis

















































































)monitoring cost. Referring to Williamson (1987), the authors assume a debt
contract with a fixed repayment. As long as borrowers payoff their debt,
lenders have no incentive to monitor the realized return on investment.
However, if borrowers renege on the debt contract, lenders will monitor the
outcome and claim the whole return on investment. The question of whether
borrowers can meet their obligations depends on the realized return on
investment, which Ce ´spedes et al. assume to be independently and
identically distributed. Given the level of debt and the required return on
this debt, one can determine a minimum threshold level of the realized
return for which the borrower is still able to payoff his debt. If the realized
return falls short of this minimum level, bankruptcy will follow shortly
thereafter and the lender will have to incur monitoring costs. These possible
costs of monitoring give rise to the existence of a risk premium on debt titles.
The level of these expected monitoring costs is shown to be dependent on the
level of investment relative to the level of net worth of the borrower. The
higher the proportion of net worth in total investment, the lower the part of
the investment, i.e. externally financed, and the lower the minimum
threshold value of the realized return for which the borrower can still repay
his debt. Hence, higher net worth is associated with a lower probability of
bankruptcy, lower expected monitoring costs and therefore a lower risk
premium. Formally, we assume that the risk premium is given by




¼ lnInvestmentt   lnNetWortht ð7Þ
all variables in non-logarithmic forms.
Equation (2) showed that the level of (real) investment is negatively related
to the deviation of the real interest rate from its natural level. For simplicity,
we assume the level of investment in (7) to be given by
ln Investmentt ¼ c   dðrt   rnÞð 8Þ
where c and d are positive constants.
Net worth is given by










where ^ ftis the level of consolidated total assets at the beginning of period t
(equal to the sum of debt and net worth), ^ dd
t is the level of consolidated
domestic debt at the beginning of period t, maturing in one period, ^ Sfix is the
level of the fixed exchange rate at the beginning of period t and ^ d
f
t is the level
of consolidated foreign debt at the beginning of period t.
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)Equation (9) shows that net worth in period t depends on the levels of the
real interest rate and the real exchange rate.
14 First, a higher real interest rate
– which is assumed to be under control of the monetary authorities –
increases debt service obligations for borrowers. As a result, the real present
value of debt increases and, for a given value of total assets, the level of real
net worth falls. Second, a devaluation of the real exchange rate also lowers
net worth, as the real domestic currency value of foreign currency debt
increases.
Substituting (8) and (9) into (7) yields the following for the domestic risk
premium:










For simplicity, we assume that in the foreign country, the real exchange rate
equals its long-run equilibrium level and that domestic and foreign debt are
zero, which yields the following for the foreign risk premium:
ln foreign risk premiumt ¼ c   ln ^ ft ð11Þ
The relative risk premium, RPt,
15 can be found by subtracting (11) from (10)
RPt ¼ln domestic risk premiumt   ln foreign risk premiumt














Using the approximation ln(1 þ x)   x we can rewrite (12) as















With the same approximation, ^ rt can be written as (1 þ rt) and ^ St=^ S
fix   
can be
rewritten as (1 þ St S
fix):












14. The level of the fixed exchange rate equals the period t price level as market participants
expected the fixed exchange rate to be maintained. Therefore, under maintenance PPP
must hold.
15. Recall that RPt denotes the logarithm of (1 þ RPt), where RPt denotes the default risk
premium on domestic debt relative to foreign debt in period t.
S. C. W. Eijffinger and B. Goderis

















































































)2.2. The monetary authorities
We assume that, before period t, the monetary authorities have been
maintaining a fixed exchange rate regime. This implies that any change in
the nominal interest rate – needed to maintain the equality in (4), given the
fixed exchange rate – is automatically facilitated by an adjustment of the
money supply. If, e.g. the foreign interest rate rises, market participants will
want to sell domestic assets, exchange the receipts for foreign currency and
buy foreign assets. Under a floating exchange rate, this would cause a
depreciation of the home currency. Under a fixed exchange rate, the
monetary authorities stand ready to buy the excess supply of domestic
currency in return for foreign currency. As a result, foreign reserves drop and
the domestic money supply falls. The resulting higher domestic interest rate
restores the equilibrium in (4) and, hence, safeguards the fixed exchange rate.
Because monetary policy has to ensure the fixed value of the currency, it is no
longer autonomous and cannot be used to stimulate output.
However, the fixed exchange rate regime is not irreversible. We assume
that the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate is a matter of tradeoff. As long
as the costs of maintenance do not exceed the costs of abandonment of this
regime, the authorities choose to maintain the fixed value. If this is no longer
the case, they abandon the peg and allow the exchange rate to float. The costs
of maintenance and abandonment are dependent on the monetary
authorities’ preferences, which are modeled by the following loss function







tþ1 þð yt   yn   kÞ
2 ð15Þ
where w is the relative weight put on price stabilization (degree of
conservativeness of the monetary authorities), Z is the monetary authorities’
rate of time preference,
16 and k is the positive wedge between the output
level targeted by the monetary authorities and the natural output level. All
three variables are assumed to be strictly positive.
We assume the monetary authorities to care about inflation and output.
Because we assume inflation in period t and t 1 to be zero, costs of inflation
can only arise from possible non-zero inflation in period t þ 1. The
importance of the costs of inflation depends on both the conservativeness
and the rate of time preference of the monetary authorities.
The output costs stem from possible deviations of output from the
monetary authorities’ desired level, yn þ k. Because output in period t 1 and
t þ 1 equals its natural level and cannot be influenced by the monetary
authorities, we only include period t output in the loss function. Possible
rationales for the positive wedge k between the desired output level and the
16. Z is short notation for (1 þ Z).
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)natural output level are the existence of political business cycles or an
imperfectly functioning labor market.
We assume that the monetary authorities decide in period t on whether or
not to maintain the fixed exchange rate. If they do, the fixed exchange rate is
maintained throughout period t and period t þ 1. If they do not, the peg is
abandoned. We assume that in case of abandonment, the exchange rate is
allowed to float and the monetary authorities cannot credibly commit to a
new peg or any intermediate exchange rate regime.
The tradeoff between costs of maintenance and costs of abandonment
closely relates to the literature on rules and discretion in monetary policy. In
particular, the ‘temptation’ to stimulate output above its natural level vs. the
‘enforcement’ through higher future inflation was first introduced by Barro
and Gordon (1983).
3. SOLVING THE MODEL
To solve the model, we first derive the discretionary equilibrium, i.e. the long-
run equilibrium under a floating exchange rate regime, which gives us the
rate of inflation under floating. We then consider an initially fixed exchange
rate regime and derive two alternative equilibria: the equilibrium under
maintenance of the fixed exchange rate in period t and the equilibrium under
abandonment of the fixed exchange rate in period t. Finally, we compare
the monetary authorities’ payoffs under both equilibria to determine the
conditions under which the peg is abandoned, i.e. to identify the
determinants of currency crises.
3.1. Discretionary equilibrium
Under a floating exchange rate and in long-run equilibrium, we assume market
participants to fully anticipate monetary policy. We also assume that they can
set prices in accordance, ensuring that output does not deviate from its natural
level. Because the desired output for the monetary authorities exceeds the
natural output level, they have an incentive to use monetary policy to lift
output above the natural level. Market participants foresee this and set prices
accordingly. The result is positive inflation without any output gain, i.e. an
inflationary bias. We define this inflationary bias as p
n, which could be
understood as ‘the natural rate of inflation’ under rational expectations.
Appendix A shows the derivation of the discretionary equilibrium. The
optimal level of the money supply is shown to be
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     k ð17Þ
The inflationary bias positively depends on l and y because these coefficients
imply the efficacy of activist monetary policy through the ‘interest rate’ and
‘exchange rate’ channels, respectively. The inflationary bias negatively
depends on b, which indicates the inverse of the impact of money supply
changes on the level of the interest rate. Higher levels of b correspond to a
lower impact of monetary loosening on the interest rate and reduce the
monetary authorities’ incentive to cheat. The inflationary bias decreases with
the monetary authorities’ degree of conservativeness, w, as inflation becomes
more costly. A higher rate of the monetary authorities’ time preference, Z,
leads instead to a higher inflationary bias, as the costs of inflation decrease in
present value terms. Finally, the positive wedge k between the monetary
authorities’ desired output level and the natural output level, which is the
root cause of the inflationary bias, has a positive effect on its size.
3.2. Equilibria under an initially fixed exchange rate
We now derive the equilibria under maintenance and abandonment of the fixed
e x c h a n g er a t er e g i m e .W ea s s u m et h ee x c h a n g er a t et ob ef i x e dt h r o u g h o u t
period t 1 and the economy to be in long-run equilibrium in period t 1. As
explained earlier, we assume the peg to be credible, i.e. market participants set
period t prices in accordance with their expectation that the fixed exchange rate
will be maintained in period t. However, we allow for deviations of domestic and
foreign debt levels from their equilibrium values, which changes the monetary
authorities’ tradeoff. If the monetary authorities decide to maintain the peg, the
economy remains in long-run equilibrium in period t. If they decide to abandon
the peg, there will be a temporary deviation from long-run equilibrium. We
consider the conditions under which abandonment (‘currency crisis’) takes place
a n d ,i np a r t i c u l a r ,h o wt h el e v e l so fd e b tr e l a t et ot h i sp o s s i b l ea b a n d o n m e n t .
3.2.1. Maintenance of the fixed exchange rate
Appendix B.1 shows the derivation of the equilibrium in case of maintenance
of the fixed exchange rate throughout period t. The costs of maintenance are
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ð18Þ
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)If debt levels equal their natural levels, the costs of maintenance simply equal
k
2. Equation (18) shows how deviations of the domestic and foreign debt
levels increase the costs of maintaining a fixed exchange rate. Intuitively, the
higher debt levels correspond to higher risk premiums on domestic assets. For
any given level of the money supply, the domestic real interest rate increases
and, as a result, output falls below its natural level, increasing the output costs
of maintenance. Because the fixed exchange rate is maintained, inflation and
the monetary authorities’ costs of inflation remain zero and thus play no role
in equation (18).
3.2.2. Abandonment of the fixed exchange rate
Appendix B.2 shows the derivation of the equilibrium in case of abandon-
ment of the fixed exchange rate in period t. The costs of abandonment are
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where A ¼
1 þ b ðÞ
b
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ð19Þ
The term for the output costs of maintenance in equation (18) also plays a
role in the abandonment equilibrium, as can be seen from the second part
between brackets in equation (19). The other part between brackets, A   pn,
refers to the costs of inflation. Because period t monetary policy is now used
to stimulate output, inflation in period t þ 1 is no longer zero. Finally, the
term before brackets, w=Z=ðw=Z þ A2Þ<1, shows that for p
n 50, i.e. if inflation
would be zero, the costs of abandonment would be lower than the costs of
maintenance. This is because the output costs under abandonment are partly
offset by a loosening of monetary policy that was not feasible under
maintenance.
3.2.3. Maintenance or collapse?
Equations (18) and (19) show the costs of maintenance and abandonment of
a fixed exchange rate regime, respectively. As long as the costs of
maintenance do not exceed the costs of abandonment, the fixed exchange
rate regime will survive. However, as soon as the costs of maintenance do
S. C. W. Eijffinger and B. Goderis

















































































)exceed the costs of abandonment, the monetary authorities will choose to
abandon the peg and install a floating exchange rate. Appendix B.3 shows
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  pn >0 ð20Þ
The function O contains several variables that together determine whether
the fixed exchange rate survives. In the next section, we derive first-order
derivatives to identify the effect of every variable on the probability of crisis,
which we think of as positively depending on the size of O.
17
3.3. Determinants of currency crises
We first consider the impact of domestic and foreign currency-denominated
debt levels on the probability of collapse.
3.3.1. Domestic and foreign debt levels
The first-order derivatives of the domestic debt level ^ d
d
t =^ ftand the foreign
debt level ^ d
f














 ! _0 ð21Þ
The first derivative in equation (21) shows that a higher level of domestic
currency denominated debt increases the probability of a currency crisis. As
shown in Appendix B.4, this is because the difference between the costs of
maintenance and the costs of abandonment increases, which makes the
abandonment of the fixed exchange rate relatively more attractive for the
monetary authorities.
Intuitively, a higher domestic debt level increases the output costs under
maintenance through a higher risk premium. The only way in which the
17. Because we did not introduce any stochastic elements, the probability of crisis is strictly
speaking either 1 or 0. However, it is easy to add for example a stochastic shock that would
introduce the possibility of crisis probabilities between 0 and 1.
Currency Crises, Monetary Policy and Corporate Balance Sheet Q1

















































































)monetary authorities can (partly) offset these higher output costs is by
abandoning the fixed exchange rate and loosening monetary policy. This
creates an incentive for the monetary authorities to abandon the fixed
exchange rate. In addition, a higher domestic debt level also makes a
loosening of monetary policy more effective in stimulating output. This is
because corporates are more heavily exposed to interest rates and an interest
rate cut thus has a larger negative effect on the risk premium.
18 Because the
risk premium is part of the interest rate, the total decrease in the interest rate
is larger and as a result the effect of monetary policy on output is also larger.
Higher domestic debt thus increases both the need for output loss
compensation and the efficacy of monetary policy in stimulating output.
The sum of these two effects dominates the increased costs of inflation
19
under abandonment. As a result, the difference between the costs of
maintenance and the costs of abandonment increases. This creates incentives
for the monetary authorities to abandon the fixed exchange rate. Hence,
higher domestic debt increases the probability of a currency crisis.
The second derivative in equation (21) shows that a higher level of foreign
currency denominated debt can either increase or decrease the probability of a
currency crisis. As shown in Appendix B.4, this is because the difference
between the costs of maintenance and the costs of abandonment can either
increase or decrease, depending on the parameter values.
Intuitively, a higher foreign debt level increases the output costs under
maintenance through a higher risk premium, just as in the case of domestic
debt. Again, this creates an incentive for the monetary authorities to abandon
the fixed exchange rate. However, whereas higher domestic debt makes
monetary policy more effective in stimulating output, higher foreign debt has
the opposite effect. Abandonment of the fixed exchange rate and a loosening
of monetary policy lead to a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
Given the higher corporate exposure to exchange rates, this depreciation has
larger adverse effects on corporates’ net worth. As a result, the risk premium
increases more or decreases less. Because the risk premium is part of the
interest rate, the total decrease in the interest rate will be smaller and the
effect of monetary policy on output is thus also smaller.
20
18. Strictly speaking, an interest rate cut can have a larger negative or a smaller positive impact
on the risk premium. This is because a loosening of monetary policy can also lead to a
higher risk premium if the investment effect dominates [see equation (B.29)]. However, the
total change in the interest rate after a loosening of monetary policy is always negative [see
equation (B.32)]. Hence, higher domestic debt amplifies the effect of monetary loosening
on the interest rate, regardless of whether the risk premium goes up or down.
19. It can be shown that the costs of inflation under abandonment increase. Intuitively, this is
because the increased incentives to compensate for output loss lead to a looser monetary
policy stance that stimulates output but comes at the cost of higher inflation.
20. From equation (B.32) and given that ^ d
f
t =^ ftr1 it follows that the increase in the risk
premium will never exceed the effect on the other components of the real interest rate. As a
result, a loosening of monetary policy will always lead to a net decrease in the real interest
rate.
S. C. W. Eijffinger and B. Goderis

















































































)Higher foreign debt thus increases the need for output loss compensation
but lowers the efficacy of monetary policy in stimulating output through the
adverse balance sheet effects of exchange rate depreciation. As a result, the
sign of the net effect of higher foreign debt on the difference between the
costs of maintenance and abandonment depends on parameter values.
Hence, the sign of the impact of higher foreign debt on the probability of a
currency crisis depends on the same parameter values.
3.3.2. Other variables
Appendix B.4 also shows the effect of changes in the other model variables on
the probability of crisis. First, an increase in the monetary authorities’ degree of
conservativeness w can either increase or decrease the probability of a currency
crisis. This is because the costs of abandonment can increase or decrease,
whereas the costs of maintenance do not change. Intuitively, the change in
the costs of abandonment consists of a change in the output costs and a
change in the costs of inflation. On the one hand, the inflation that arises
from a loosening of monetary policy is valued more negatively by the
monetary authorities. This makes the use of monetary policy to stimulate
output more costly. As a result, the output loss is less compensated for and
hence the output costs in the abandonment equilibrium increase.
On the other hand, however, the total costs of inflation go down. This is
because the increase in the money supply and thus the part of inflation that
follows from it will be smaller as inflation is valued more negatively.
Moreover, the inflationary bias also goes down as the monetary authorities
have less of an incentive to stimulate output through surprise inflation. These
negative effects on the level of inflation more than offset the increased
negative valuation of inflation. As a result, the total costs of inflation, equal
to the level of inflation multiplied by the valuation of inflation (degree of
conservativeness) by the monetary authorities, decrease. With the output
costs increasing and the inflation costs decreasing, the sign of the total
impact on the costs of abandonment depends on the parameter values.
Analogous to the degree of conservatism, a higher increase in the monetary
authorities’ rate of time preference Z can also either increase or decrease the
probability of a currency crisis. The effect of a higher rate of time preference is
exactly opposite to the effect of an increase in conservatism. This is because
the rate of time preference in our model only relates to the difference in
valuation between inflation (period t þ 1) and output loss (period t). Hence, a
higher time preference implies that the level of inflation in period t is valued
less negatively compared with the output loss in period t. As a result, the
effect of higher time preference is similar to the effect of lower conservatism.
Next, an increase in the wedge between the output level targeted by the
monetary authorities and the natural output level, k, is shown to either increase
or decrease the probability of a currency crisis. On the one hand, a higher
level of targeted output increases the output costs for any given level of
Currency Crises, Monetary Policy and Corporate Balance Sheet Q1

















































































)output under maintenance. These higher output costs can be (partly) offset
by an abandonment of the fixed exchange rate and a loosening of monetary
policy. This creates an incentive to abandon the fixed exchange rate. On the
other hand, however, a higher output target increases the inflationary bias
because the monetary authorities are more inclined to generate surprise
inflation in order to stimulate output. This creates an incentive to maintain
the fixed exchange rate under which inflation remains zero.
The effect of the natural domestic real interest rate rn(5c) is straightforward.
A higher natural domestic real interest rate lowers firms’ net worth. This leads
to a higher risk premium and lower output. Hence, the costs of maintenance
increase and the only way to partly offset the higher output costs is an
abandonment of the fixed exchange rate and a loosening of monetary policy.
This creates an incentive to abandon the fixed exchange rate and thus
increases the probability of a currency crisis.
A higher interest rate elasticity of investment, d, means a lower level of
investment for any level of the real interest rate that exceeds the natural
domestic real interest rate [see equation (14)]. This lower investment level
decreases the risk premium and hence decreases the output costs under
maintenance. This creates an incentive for the monetary authorities to
maintain the fixed exchange rate, as there is less need for output
compensation. In addition, a higher interest rate elasticity of investment
also makes monetary policy less effective in stimulating output. This is
because an interest rate cut will have a larger positive impact on investments,
which everything else equal increases the risk premium. Because the risk
premium is part of the interest rate, the total decrease in the interest rate is
smaller and as a result the effect of monetary policy on output is also smaller.
A higher interest rate elasticity of investment thus decreases both the need for
output loss compensation and the efficacy of monetary policy in stimulating
output. The sum of these two effects dominates the lower costs of inflation
under abandonment that follow from the smaller incentive to stimulate
output. As a result, the difference between the costs of maintenance and the
costs of abandonment becomes smaller. This creates incentives for the
monetary authorities to maintain the fixed exchange rate. Hence, a higher
interest rate elasticity of investment decreases the probability of a currency
crisis.
Next, an increase in the real exchange rate elasticity of output, y, is shown to
either increase or decrease the probability of a currency crisis. On the one
hand, monetary policy becomes more effective in stimulating output because
the depreciation that follows from a monetary loosening has a larger positive
impact on output. This creates an incentive to abandon the fixed exchange
rate. On the other hand, a higher real exchange rate elasticity of output
increases the inflationary bias as the monetary authorities are more inclined
to loosen monetary policy in order to stimulate output through a depreciated
exchange rate. This creates an incentive to maintain the fixed exchange rate
under which inflation remains zero.
S. C. W. Eijffinger and B. Goderis

















































































)A higher real interest rate elasticity of output, l, also either increases or
decreases the probability of crisis. On the one hand, for non-zero domestic or
foreign debt, the output costs of maintenance increase through the higher
negative impact of the interest rate on investments and output. This creates
an incentive for the monetary authorities to abandon the fixed exchange
rate. In addition, a higher real interest rate elasticity of output also makes a
loosening of monetary policy more effective in stimulating output. This is
because the drop in the interest rate that follows the loosening of monetary
policy has a larger positive impact on output. This adds to the incentive for
abandonment. However, a higher interest rate elasticity of output also
increases the inflationary bias because monetary policy becomes more
effective and hence the monetary authorities will be more inclined to use
it. The increased inflationary bias creates an incentive to maintain the fixed
exchange rate.
Finally, a higher nominal interest rate elasticity of money demand, b, either
increases or decreases the probability of crisis. A higher b means that after an
increase in the money supply, the interest rate does not have to fall by as
much as before in order to restore money market equilibrium (see equation
(1)). Hence, monetary policy becomes less effective in stimulating output,
creating an incentive for monetary authorities to maintain the fixed
exchange rate. On the other hand, the lower efficacy of monetary policy
also leads to a lower inflationary bias as the monetary authorities are less
inclined to loosen monetary policy. This creates an incentive to abandon the
fixed exchange rate.
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has studied how the exposure of a country’s corporate sector to
interest rate and exchange rate changes affects the decision of monetary
authorities to maintain or abandon a fixed exchange rate. If corporate
balance sheets are vulnerable to high interest rates, monetary authorities are
less inclined to maintain a fixed exchange rate regime. However, if corporate
balance sheets are instead vulnerable to depreciations of the exchange rate,
this may urge monetary authorities to hold on to a fixed exchange rate to
avoid adverse balance sheet effects.
These issues were analyzed using a model in which the monetary
authorities are assumed to care about output and inflation. Currency crises
were defined as situations in which the costs of maintaining a fixed exchange
rate exceed the costs of abandonment. The impact of corporate exposures on
the probability of crises was investigated by looking at the effect of aggregate
debt levels on both the costs of maintenance and the costs of abandonment.
The results showed that a higher level of domestic currency denominated debt
increases the probability of a currency crisis. This is because a higher domestic
debt implies a lower level of firms’ net worth, which increases the risk
Currency Crises, Monetary Policy and Corporate Balance Sheet Q1

















































































)premium they pay on external funds. This higher risk premium leads to lower
investments and lower output. Monetary authorities can use monetary policy
to limit output losses but they can only do so by abandoning the fixed
exchange rate. Hence, increased output losses create an incentive for the
monetary authorities to abandon the fixed exchange rate. However, higher
domestic debt not only increases the monetary authorities’ urge to use
monetary policy to stimulate output. It also increases the efficacy of
monetary policy in stimulating output. This is because the higher exposure
to interest rate changes means that a loosening of monetary policy has a
larger positive impact on corporate balance sheets and leads to a lower risk
premium. This lower risk premium adds to the conventional effect of an
increase in the money supply and hence increases the total effect of monetary
policy on output. This increased efficacy of monetary policy adds to the
incentive to abandon the fixed exchange rate because abandonment is the
only way in which monetary policy can be used to boost output. It was shown
that the higher need for output loss compensation and the higher efficacy of
monetary policy in stimulating output together dominate the effect of higher
inflation on incentives. As a result, higher domestic debt increases the
probability of a currency crisis.
We next showed that a higher level of foreign currency denominated debt can
either increase or decrease the probability of a currency crisis. Analogous to
the case of domestic debt, higher foreign debt increases the costs of
maintenance through a higher risk premium and lower output. Because the
monetary authorities want to compensate for these output losses, they face
an incentive to abandon the fixed exchange rate. However, whereas higher
domestic debt increases the effect of monetary policy on output, higher
foreign debt does the opposite. An increase in the money supply leads to a
lower interest rate and a depreciation of the exchange rate. As corporates are
more exposed to exchange rate changes, this depreciation has larger adverse
effects on corporates’ net worth and thus on the risk premium they pay. This
higher risk premium partly cancels the conventional effect of monetary
policy on output and hence decreases the efficacy of monetary policy. This
lower efficacy creates an incentive to maintain the fixed exchange rate as the
benefits from abandonment decrease, everything else equal. Higher foreign
debt thus increases the need for output loss compensation but lowers the
efficacy of monetary policy in stimulating output through the adverse
balance sheet effects of exchange rate depreciation. As a result, the sign of the
net effect of higher foreign debt on the probability of crisis was shown to
depend on the model’s parameter values.
Finally, the impact of several other possible crisis determinants on the
probability of crises was analyzed.
The analysis in this paper shows that corporate balance sheet vulnerabil-
ities can be an important determinant of currency crises by eroding the
commitment of monetary authorities to defend a fixed exchange rate regime.
If countries want to reduce the probability and output costs of currency crises,
S. C. W. Eijffinger and B. Goderis

















































































)it is recommendable to limit the exposure of their corporate and banking
sectors to changes in the short-term interest rate and the exchange rate. This
might, e.g. be accomplished by further developing local equity markets in
emerging market countries. Such markets reduce the leverage of corporates by
allowing them to finance themselves through the stock market rather than
solely through banks or bond markets. Equity provides a more permanent
source of finance, as opposed to, e.g. bank lending, which is in most cases
short term and thus needs to be rolled over. It has also been shown to be a
relatively resilient source of new financing during the Asian crisis. Both of
these characteristics make corporates that finance themselves through equity
more resistant against short-term interest rate increases and/or a sudden stop
of bank lending (credit crunch) (IMF, 2002). Financial supervision and
regulation can also reduce the exposures of banks and corporates. Require-
ments as to how much reserve capital banks and corporates should hold, how
much short-term funding they may obtain and how much of their liabilities
can be in foreign currency could provide some safeguards against the risk of
crises and the social externalities that go with them.
APPENDIX A: DISCRETIONARY LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM
To derive the period t equilibrium, we first consider period t 1, period t and
period t þ 1.
A.1. Period t 1
Recalling equation (4), the domestic t 1 interest rate is given by
it 1 ¼ i* þ St   St 1 þ RPt 1 ðA:1Þ
The foreign nominal interest rate equals c. Given PPP in all periods and
perfect foresight, St St 1 equals p
n. Furthermore, because the domestic
economy is in long-run equilibrium, the absolute domestic risk premium
equals the absolute foreign risk premium (50). Recalling (14), this implies
that the domestic real interest rate and the debt ratios
21 equal their long-run
equilibrium levels. As a consequence, RPt 150. Equation (A.1) can be
rewritten as
it 1 ¼ c þ pn ðA:2Þ
This yields the following money market equilibrium (equation (1)):
Mt 1   pt 1 ¼ g   bðc þ pnÞð A:3Þ
21. For simplicity, we assume the long-run equilibrium debt ratios to be equal to zero.
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The price level in period t simply equals the sum of the t 1 price level and
the natural inflation rate:
pt ¼ pt 1 þ pn ðA:4Þ
Money market equilibrium in period t is similar to equation (1),
22 with
RPt50.
Mt ¼ pt þ g   b   it ðA:5Þ
Substituting (A.3) and (A.4) into (A.5) yields
Mt ¼ Mt 1 þ pn   bðit   c   pnÞð A:6Þ
(A.6) shows how the existence of rational expectations influences the money
market equilibrium. First of all, the nominal money supply in period t has to
exceed the level in the previous period in order to keep up with the expected
‘natural rate of inflation’ (p
n). In addition, deviations of the money supply
from its long-run equilibrium-supporting value correspond to deviations of it
from its equilibrium value c þ p
n.
A.3. Period t þ 1
We assume that in period t þ 1 the economy is in long-run equilibrium
Mtþ1   ptþ1 ¼ g   bðc þ pnÞð A:7Þ
Because the period t þ 1 price level is set to ensure that output will be at its
natural level, it equals the sum of the price level that supports the
equilibrium, given the period t money supply and the natural rate of
inflation:
ptþ1 ¼ pn þ Mt   g þ bðc þ pnÞð A:8Þ
A.4. Equilibrium
Rewriting equation (A.5) yields the following expression for the period t price
level.
pt ¼ Mt   g þ b   it ðA:9Þ
22. In equation (1) the price level was denoted as fixed. We assume, throughout this paper, that
the price level cannot be adjusted throughout period t. However, the price level in equation
(1) was assumed to be fixed as long as the fixed exchange rate regime was maintained. Here,
monetary policy is discretionary and the price level changes every period.
S. C. W. Eijffinger and B. Goderis

















































































)For the level of inflation in period t þ 1, this implies
ptþ1   pt ¼ pn þ bðc þ pn   itÞð A:10Þ
Rewriting equation (A.6) yields
it ¼ 
ðMt   Mt 1   pnÞ
b
þ c þ pn ðA:11Þ
Substituting (A.11) into (A.10) and rearranging yields
ptþ1   pt ¼ Mt   Mt 1 ðA:12Þ
Equation (A.12) defines the first part of the monetary authorities’ loss
function in terms of the money supply Mt. Turning to the second part of the
monetary authorities’ loss function, the effect of monetary policy on output
in period t runs through the real interest rate, rt, and through the nominal
exchange rate, St:
yt ¼ yn   lðrt   rnÞþyðSt   ptÞð A:13Þ
We first consider the ‘interest rate channel’,  l (rt rn). Recall (A.11):
it ¼ 
ðMt   Mt 1   pnÞ
b
þ c þ pn ðA:14Þ
Also recall that
it ¼ rt þ _ ptþ1 ¼ rt þ Mt   Mt 1 ðA:15Þ




Mt   Mt 1   pn ðÞ þ c ðA:16Þ
Turning to the exchange rate effect of monetary policy on output in period t,
St pt, recall equation (4):
it ¼ i* þð Stþ1   StÞþRPt ðA:17Þ
With RPt50 and i* 5c, (A.17) can be rewritten as
St ¼ Stþ1  ð it   cÞð A:18Þ
Recall that we assumed long-run equilibrium in period t þ 1, where PPP holds.
Consequently, St þ 1 equals pt þ 1. Subtracting pt yields
St   pt ¼ ptþ1   pt  ð it   cÞð A:19Þ
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)Substituting (A.11) and (A.12) into (A.19) yields
St   pt ¼ Mt   Mt 1   







ðMt   Mt 1   pnÞð A:20Þ
We can now write the monetary authorities’ loss function in terms of the
nominal money supply and solve for the optimal level of the money supply.







tþ1 þð   lðrt   rnÞþyðSt   ptÞ kÞ
2 ðA:21Þ





ðMt   Mt 1Þ




ðMt   Mt 1   pnÞ k
   2
ðA:22Þ
Minimization of the monetary authorities’ loss function in terms of the
money supply yields the optimal level of the money supply:















The inflationary bias, p
n, can now be made explicit. We assumed perfect
foresight; hence:
pn ¼ _ ptþ1 ¼ Mt   Mt 1 ðA:24Þ
Substituting (A.24) into (A.23) and solving for Mt yields




  k ðA:25Þ





     k ðA:26Þ
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)APPENDIX B: EQUILIBRIA UNDER AN INITIALLY FIXED
EXCHANGE RATE
B.1. Maintenance of the fixed exchange rate
Again, we consider periods t 1, t and t þ 1, but now under the assumption
that the monetary authorities have been running a fixed exchange rate in
period t 1 and continue to do so in period t and t þ 1.
B.1.1. Period t 1
Assuming long-run equilibrium, the risk premium is assumed to be zero
(RPt 150). Furthermore, because the monetary authorities maintain the peg,
the exchange rate remains constant. Consequently, equation (4) can be
reduced to
it 1 ¼ c ðB:1Þ
For the money market equilibrium this implies the following:
Mt 1     pt 1 ¼ g   b   c ðB:2Þ
B.1.2. Period t
Assuming a fixed exchange rate and allowing for deviations of debt levels
from their natural levels, equation (4) can be reduced to
it ¼ c þ RPt ðB:3Þ
Money market equilibrium now implies
Mt ¼   pt þ g   b   c ðB:4Þ
and, because the price level has not changed
Mt ¼ Mt 1 ðB:5Þ
B.1.3. Period t þ 1
Under the assumptions that the fixed exchange rate is maintained through-
out period t and the debt levels return to their natural levels, the equilibrium
in period t is similar to the period t 1 equilibrium:
itþ1 ¼ c ðB:6Þ
Because the price level has not changed, money market equilibrium is
identical to period t 1
Mtþ1     ptþ1 ¼ g   b   c ðB:7Þ
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Because we have assumed that the monetary authorities maintain the peg, we








tþ1 þð   lðrt   rnÞþyðSt   ptÞ kÞ
2 ðB:8Þ
As shown above, the price level remains fixed. Consequently, period t þ 1
inflation equals zero. Moreover, the level of the exchange rate also remains
fixed. Given the assumption of PPP in period t 1, this implies that the
period t price level equals the period t level of the exchange rate. Equation
(B.8) can therefore be reduced to
LCB
t ¼ð   lðrt   rnÞ kÞ
2 ðB:9Þ
Because inflation is zero, the domestic real interest rate equals the domestic
nominal interest rate
rt ¼ it ¼ c þ RPt ðB:10Þ
Substituting (14) into (B.10) yields











For St   Sfix ¼ 0; rearranging yields
rt ¼
ð1 þ dÞ c þ
^ d
d


















  c þ
^ d
d












B B B B B @
1
C C C C C A
þ k
0
B B B B B @
1
C C C C C A
2
ðB:13Þ
B.2. Abandonment of the fixed exchange rate
We now consider the case where the monetary authorities abandon the fixed
exchange rate in period t. Period t 1 is unchanged.
S. C. W. Eijffinger and B. Goderis


















































































By abandoning the peg, the monetary authorities regain their monetary
policy autonomy and set the money supply so as to minimize their loss
function. Given the possible deviation of debt levels in period t, money
market equilibrium denotes the following:
Mt     pt ¼ g   bðit   RPtÞð B:14Þ
Given that   pt ¼   pt 1, (B.14) can be rewritten as
ðit   RPtÞ¼ 




Mt   Mt 1 ðÞ
b
þ c ðB:15Þ
Recall equation (4) for the revised uncovered interest parity condition
it ¼ i* þð Stþ1   StÞþRPt ðB:16Þ
B.2.2. Period t þ 1
We assume that, given the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate in period
t, the economy will adjust to its new long-run equilibrium in period t þ 1.
Therefore, the t þ 1 price level equals the equilibrium level in case the money
supply stays at its period t level, plus the anticipated money supply change
23:
ptþ1 ¼ pn þ Mt   g þ bðc þ pnÞð B:17Þ
Further, the money market equilibrium and uncovered interest parity
equations are given by
Mtþ1   ptþ1 ¼ g   bðc þ pnÞð B:18Þ
itþ1 ¼ c þ pn ðB:19Þ
B.2.3. Equilibrium








tþ1 þð   lðrt   rnÞþyðSt   ptÞ kÞ
2 ðB:20Þ
23. Recall that this anticipated change simply equals the level of the inflationary bias, as
derived in Appendix A.
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)Starting with inflation, combining (B.14) and (B.17) yields
ptþ1     pt ¼ pn þ Mt   g þ bðc þ pnÞ Mt þ g   bðit   RPtÞ
¼ pn   bðit   RPt  ð c þ pnÞÞ ðB:21Þ
Substituting (B.15) into (B.21) yields
ptþ1     pt ¼ð 1 þ bÞpn þ Mt   Mt 1 ðB:22Þ
Turning to the second part of the monetary authorities’ loss function, the
effect of monetary policy on output in period t runs through the real interest
rate, rt, and through the nominal exchange rate, St.
yt ¼ yn   lðrt   rnÞþyðSt     ptÞð B:23Þ
We will first consider the ‘interest rate channel’. Recall (B.15):
it ¼ 
Mt   Mt 1 ðÞ
b
þ c þ RPt ðB:24Þ
Equation (14) defined the risk premium











The term St S
fix is not exogenous as it is dependent on the interest rate.
Rewriting equation (4) yields
St ¼  ð it   RPt   i*ÞþStþ1 ðB:26Þ
Given i* ¼ c and Stþ1 ¼ ptþ1, and substituting (B.15), (B.26) can be written as
St ¼
ðMt   Mt 1Þ
b
þ ptþ1 ðB:27Þ
Recall that Sfix ¼   pt; substituting (B.19) for the level of inflation yields
St   Sfix ¼
ðMt   Mt 1Þ
b
þ ptþ1     pt ¼
ð1 þ bÞ
b
ðMt   Mt 1 þ b   pnÞð B:28Þ
Substituting (B.28) into (B.25) yields the following:








ðMt   Mt 1 þ b   pnÞ
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)Substituting this result into (B.24)
it ¼ 
ðMt   Mt 1Þ
b








ðMt   Mt 1 þ b   pnÞ





Recall that, once period t monetary policy is known, the t þ 1 level of
inflation and, consequently, the period t real interest rate is also known:
it ¼ rt þ _ ptþ1 ¼ rt þ 1 þ b ðÞ pn þ Mt   Mt 1 ðÞ ð B:31Þ
Combining (B.30) and (B.31), and rearranging yields
rt ¼
1 þ d ðÞ   c þ
^ d
d
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 ! ðMt   Mt 1 þ b   pnÞð B:32Þ
Turning to the exchange rate effect of monetary policy on output in period t,
St pt ð¼ St   SfixÞ, recall equation (B.28):
St   pt ¼
ð1 þ bÞ
b
ðMt   Mt 1 þ b   pnÞð B:33Þ
Using (B.19), (B.32) and (B.33), we can now write the monetary authorities’
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2
where A ¼
1 þ b ðÞ
b
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0
B B B B B @
1
C C C C C A
ðB:34Þ
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)Minimization of the monetary authorities’ loss function in terms of the
money supply yields the optimal level of the money supply:
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ðB:36Þ
B.3. Maintenance or collapse?
The monetary authorities will abandon the fixed exchange rate regime if the
costs of maintenance exceed the costs of abandonment. Recalling equations
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ðB:37Þ
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  pn >0 ðB:38Þ
Hereafter, we define the left-hand side of (B.38) as O.
B.4. Crisis determinants
B.4.1. Domestic debt level
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)B.4.2. Foreign debt level
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